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Syntax on Sin Tax: The Supreme Court of North Carolina
Invigorates the Just and Equitable Tax Clause*
[E]quity is a law in our hearts; it conforms to no rule, but to
circumstances, and decides by the consciousness of right and
wrong.
—George Crabb1
INTRODUCTION
The North Carolina Constitution requires the power of taxation
to be “exercised in a just and equitable manner.”2 For seventy-eight
years after the language was adopted by amendment, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina made perfunctory references to the Just and
Equitable Tax Clause without addressing it as a substantive claim.3 In
2013, Internet gambling parlors successfully challenged high license
fees imposed on them by the city of Lumberton.4 The court agreed
with the businesses that the new taxes were not “just and equitable,”
and for the first time expressly held that the Clause functions as a
substantive limitation on the government’s power to tax.5 But the
court did not interpret the constitutional language or articulate a
standard for applying the Clause, leaving its parameters yet to be
determined.6

* © 2015 K. Dawn Milam.
1. GEORGE CRABB, CRABB’S ENGLISH SYNONYMES 467 (Centennial ed. 1917).
2. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1); see also IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456,
457, 738 S.E.2d 156, 157 (2013) (“While the decision to levy a privilege license tax is within
the discretion of legislative entities, any tax so levied must be just and equitable.”). The
Supreme Court of North Carolina has referred to this language as the “Just and Equitable
Tax Clause.” See, e.g., Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 457, 738 S.E.2d at 157.
3. See Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 459, 738 S.E.2d at 158 (“While the Just and Equitable
Tax Clause has been cited in several decisions, it has not been directly addressed as a
substantive claim in its own right.”).
4. See id. at 458–59, 738 S.E.2d at 157–58.
5. See id. at 457–58, 738 S.E.2d at 157.
6. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160 (“If the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has any
substantive force, as we hold it does, it surely renders the present tax invalid. In light of
the unusual facts we confront in the present case, and cognizant of the nearly universal
deference by courts to legislative tax classifications, we do not attempt to define the full
parameters of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause’s limitations on the legislative taxing
power.”).
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Meanwhile, the North Carolina legislature radically overhauled
the state’s tax code.7 While dramatically reducing income taxes for
wealthy residents,8 lawmakers increased the sales tax on mobile
homes to a rate higher than comparable rates for either vehicles or
site-built homes.9 Both the General Assembly’s expansive tax
restructuring and the decision in IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton10
(“Lumberton”) illuminate the complex political and moral
considerations that influence tax policy. Though traditional criteria of
horizontal and vertical equity provide a structure for analysis,11 a
“fair” tax system is ultimately a function of one’s conception of
economic justice.
This Recent Development explores whether the Supreme Court
of North Carolina could apply principles of tax fairness to overturn
7. See Jeanne Sahadi, North Carolina’s Republican Tax Experiment, CNN MONEY
(Aug. 8, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/08/pf/taxes/tax-reform-north-carolina/. Part
of the proposal included a modified flat tax, which lowered the income tax rate on North
Carolina’s highest earners from 7.5% to 5.8%. Derick Waller, Lower NC Flat Tax Starts
Wednesday, But Many Will Still Pay More, WNCN NEWS (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://www.wnct.com/story/24332326/lower-nc-flat-tax-takes-effect-wednesday-but-manywill-pay-more.
8. See Mark Binker, Breaking Down the 2013 Tax Package, WRAL (July 19, 2013),
http://www.wral.com/breaking-down-the-2013-tax-package/12678653 (noting that “[b]oth
proponents and opponents of the plan acknowledge that the biggest breaks will go to the
highest income earners”).
9. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (2013) (imposing a 0.2% tax on
transfers of real property), and Act of May 29, 2014, ch. 3, § 6.1(g), __ N.C. Sess. Laws __,
__ (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-187.3) (imposing a 3% highway use tax on the
transfer of title to a motor vehicle), with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a) (2013) (imposing
the general sales tax rate of 4.75% on the sale of “manufactured homes”).
10. 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013).
11. See infra note 61 and accompanying text. Though this paper begins with the
commonly identifiable theories of horizontal and vertical equity, an individual’s beliefs
about the world, experiences, and even religious faith will influence what she accepts as a
“fair” application of these principles. See, e.g., Patrick B. Crawford, Analyzing Fairness
Principles in Tax Policy: A Pragmatic Approach, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 155, 179 (1998)
(“All tax systems, progressive or flat, overtly redistributive or not, are moral schemes of
consumption. It is a mistake to think that not taxing the rich at higher rates (and thus
more) is somehow value-free or value-neutral.”); Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of
Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671, 673 (2006)
(applying “the moral principles of Judeo-Christian ethics to the fundamental federal tax
policy issues addressing the morally required level of revenues that must be raised and
how the tax burden should be allocated among taxpayers at different levels of income and
wealth”); Ajay K. Mehrotra, “Render Unto Caesar . . . ”: Religion/Ethics, Expertise, and the
Historical Underpinnings of the Modern American Tax System, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321,
323 (2009) (exploring “the religious and ethical underpinnings of our modern tax
system”). Even decisions about what is “like” or “unlike” treatment rely on some other
source of valuation. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537,
546–47 (1982) (“Just as no categories of ‘like’ people exist in nature, neither do categories
of ‘like’ treatment exist; treatments can only be alike in reference to some moral rule.”).
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statutes that disproportionately harm the poor, not just those that
harm business interests. The paper then contemplates whether
judicial review of tax policy is an effective and desirable mechanism
to address questions of economic justice. Part I presents the history of
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause and the background and reasoning
of Lumberton. Part II applies traditional tax equity principles both to
assess the Lumberton court’s analysis and to pose a theoretical
challenge to the mobile home sales tax increase. Part III considers the
role of the judiciary in determining fiscal policy and evaluates the
respective effectiveness of the political process and the courts in
promoting meaningful public debate about economic justice.
I. BACKGROUND AND RECENT VITALIZATION OF THE JUST AND
EQUITABLE TAX CLAUSE
A. The Just and Equitable Tax Clause: Adoption and Application
The Just and Equitable Tax Clause (“the Clause”) requires that
“[t]he power of taxation . . . be exercised in a just and equitable
manner.”12 The Clause was part of an amendment crafted by the
General Assembly and adopted by North Carolina voters in 1935.13
Prior to the amendment, all taxes on property—except home loans—
were assessed on a strictly uniform ad valorem basis.14 The tax
provisions in the amendment replaced this requirement with a more
expansive grant of discretion to the legislature.15 The new tax
provisions allowed the legislature to classify different types of
property and consider other facts and circumstances to determine
property taxes.16 But this broad taxation power came with a limit: it
must be exercised in a “just and equitable manner.”17

12. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1).
13. See Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 248, § 1, 1935 N.C. Sess. Laws 270, 270 (ratified by
popular election and codified as amended at N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1)).
14. M. T. Van Hecke, A New Constitution for North Carolina, 12 N.C. L. REV. 193,
193–94 (1934). An ad valorem tax is “imposed proportionally on the value of
something . . . rather than on its quantity or some other measure.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1469 (7th ed. 1999).
15. Van Hecke, supra note 14, at 194 (“The proposed new constitution removes all of
these limitations and substitutes four new ones: (1) The taxing power must be exercised in
a just and equitable manner and only for public purposes; (2) local taxes may only be
levied in accordance with general laws and under state supervision of local budgets and tax
levies; (3) taxes for debt service are to be diminished by new limitations upon the creation
of state and local indebtedness; and (4) the Governor is given the veto power over all
legislation, including tax laws, not subject to popular vote.” (citations omitted)).
16. Id. at 194–96.
17. Id. at 195–96.
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At the time the Just and Equitable Tax Clause was added to the
North Carolina Constitution, at least one scholar believed that the
Clause would indeed function expressly as a mechanism for judicial
review. M. T. Van Hecke, then Dean of the University of North
Carolina School of Law, published an article in the North Carolina
Law Review to explain the key changes in the state constitution.18 He
wrote to assuage concerns of “arbitrary and discriminating legislative
action” that some North Carolinians feared the expansive new taxing
power might engender.19 Van Hecke argued that courts could assess
fair treatment in taxation just as they did in due process and equal
protection matters:
The new limitation that “the power of taxation shall be
exercised in a just and equitable manner” invokes this
protection. That this will give rise to new legislative and judicial
problems of no inconsiderable factual difficulty, is not to be
denied. That these difficulties are not prohibitive is evident
from our experience with taxes levied on sources other than
property.20
For Van Hecke, the complexities created by judicial review did not
prevent the Clause from operating as a meaningful limitation on the
legislature.
In spite of Van Hecke’s prediction, before the Lumberton
decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina had primarily cited
the Clause either as part of the Public Purpose doctrine,21 which
provides that taxation must benefit the public rather than the private
sector, or in conjunction with the provisions for property taxes in
Article V, Sections 2(2), 2(3), and 2(5) of the state constitution.22
18. Id. at 193. The new tax provisions replaced the constitution’s strict uniformity
requirements and allowed the legislature more latitude in classifying property. Id. at 194–
95. Van Hecke explained that the uniformity requirements had, for instance, prevented
the legislature from providing relief to “unproductive property” during the Depression. Id.
at 195. He argued that the new provisions allowed the legislature to consider a number of
contextual facts in assigning property tax values that would bring property taxes in line
with other forms of taxation in the state. Id.
19. Id. at 195.
20. Id. at 196.
21. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(1); see Piedmont Triad Airport Auth. v. Urbine, 354 N.C.
336, 338, 554 S.E.2d 331, 332 (2001); Maready v. Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 713, 467
S.E.2d 615, 619 (1996).
22. See Smith v. State, 349 N.C. 332, 340–41, 507 S.E.2d 28, 33 (1998); In re Martin,
286 N.C. 66, 75–76, 209 S.E.2d 766, 773 (1974). Subsection 2 allows the General Assembly
to classify property for tax purposes, but only by “general law uniformly applicable in
every county, city and town, and other unit of local government.” N.C. CONST. art. V,
§ 2(2). Subsections 3 and 5 repeat this phrase as a requirement for tax exemptions and
property taxes, respectively. N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2(3), (5).
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However, the court had never interpreted the language or applied the
Clause as a distinct substantive limitation on tax policy.23
In fact, only two of the early cases appear to address the Clause
directly, although both holdings principally rest on other doctrines. In
State v. Harris,24 the court overturned a state license tax that applied
only to businesses in certain locations.25 The court cited the Just and
Equitable Tax Clause and explained that “[i]t cannot be successfully
maintained that a tax . . . is equitably levied when a large number of
the counties of the State are not included and citizens therein engaged
in a like business are left immune from the tax.”26 In Nesbitt v. Gill,27
the court upheld a graduated license tax on horse salesmen.28 Briefly
referencing the Just and Equitable language, the court reasoned that
exemption from other taxes may weigh in favor of a license tax’s
validity.29 Instead of a check on legislative tax decisions, the Clause
had become a mere preliminary incantation.
B.

IMT, Inc. v. Lumberton30: Just and Equitable as a Substantive
Limitation

In 2010, the City of Lumberton (“City”) amended the formula
for privilege license taxes31 on businesses where “ ‘persons utilize
electronic machines . . . to conduct games of chance.’ ”32 In prior
23. See IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 459, 738 S.E.2d 156, 158 (2013)
(“While the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has been cited in several decisions, it has not
been directly addressed as a substantive claim in its own right.”).
24. 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
25. Id. at 753, 6 S.E.2d at 859 (“[A]ny law which, purporting to operate on a particular
class, places upon those engaged in the business in a portion of the State a burden for the
privilege which is exercised freely and without additional charge by those engaged in the
business in other parts of the State, is arbitrary in classification because it discriminates
within the class originally selected and extends to the latter a privilege and immunity not
accorded to those who must, under the law, pay the additional exaction or quit the
business.”).
26. Id.
27. 227 N.C. 174, 41 S.E.2d 646 (1947).
28. Id. at 180, 41 S.E.2d at 651. The challenged statute provided for a graduated
license tax that increased the amount owed according to the number of horses and/or
mules purchased for resale. Id. at 177, 41 S.E.2d at 648–49.
29. Id. at 178–80, 41 S.E.2d at 649–51 (explaining that the sales of horses and mules
were exempt from the 3% state sales tax).
30. 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013).
31. Privilege license taxes are “imposed for the privilege of carrying on the business,
exercising the privilege or doing the act named in Article 2, Schedule B of the Revenue
Laws of North Carolina.” Scope and NatureRules and Bulletins, N.C. DEP’T OF
REVENUE, http://www.dornc.com/taxes/license/scope.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
32. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 458, 738 S.E.2d at 157 (alteration in original) (quoting
LUMBERTON, N.C., CODE § 12-60.1(15) (2013), available at https://www.municode.com/
library/nc/lumberton/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=14291).
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years, the privilege license tax on such establishments had been a
fixed annual amount of $12.50.33 The new calculation taxed both the
business location and the number of computer terminals at the
location.34 At $5,000 per location and $2,500 per computer, each cyber
gaming establishment would owe a minimum tax of $7,500.35 The
amounts actually levied on the four companies challenging the tax
ranged from $75,000 to $137,500.36
Several businesses sued the City to prevent enforcement of the
tax, but the trial court granted and the court of appeals affirmed
summary judgment for the City.37 Responding to the businesses’
argument that the tax violated the Just and Equitable Tax Clause in
Article V, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution, the Court
of Appeals of North Carolina applied common law principles to
determine that the tax was indeed constitutional.38 The central
doctrine of Just and Equitable, according to the court of appeals, was
grounded in the common law axiom that a “tax must not be so high as
to amount to a prohibition of the particular business.”39 It was the
relationship between the privilege license tax and the establishment’s
revenue—not the prior tax—that determined the new tax’s validity.40
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Robert C. Hunter acknowledged
the common law prohibitive tax standard but suggested that the
variation in the privilege license tax structure should preclude
summary judgment.41 Judge Hunter argued that the significant
disparity between the high taxes levied on cyber gaming
establishments and the “modest” taxes imposed on other businesses
should be at least a consideration in the equity of the tax.42
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. Cyber gaming establishments can generate a “tremendous amount of money,
hundreds of millions of dollars[,]” according to Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine.
Pamela M. Prah, States Battle Illegal Gambling at Internet Cafes, USA TODAY (Mar. 24,
2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/24/stateline-illegal-gamblinginternet-cafes/6829731/. Noting the problem with “largely unreported profits,” the
American Gaming Association recommends that states strictly regulate Internet cafes.
Internet Sweepstakes Cafes, AM. GAMING ASS’N, http://www.americangaming.org/
government-affairs/priority-issues/internet-sweepstakes-cafes (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
37. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 38, 724 S.E.2d 588, 590 (2012),
rev’d, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013).
38. Id. at 45–47, 724 S.E.2d at 595–96.
39. Id. at 45, 724 S.E.2d at 595.
40. Id. at 46–47, 724 S.E.2d at 595–96.
41. Id. at 48–49, 724 S.E.2d at 597 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (“[The amounts levied on the cyber gaming establishment are] in stark
contrast to the modest annual license tax imposed on any other business, such as:
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The Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed the appellate
court’s holding and rejected the common law approach to interpreting
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause.43 The court observed that the
common law cases cited by the appellate court predated the 1935
amendment to Article V44 and that the amendment did not adopt the
“unreasonable and prohibitory” language from common law.45
According to the court, the new language—“[t]he power of taxation
shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner”—possessed
substantive power that had yet to be applied as an independent
claim.46
Noting the “tension” that arises between the government’s taxing
authority and the constitutional limitation on unjust and inequitable
taxes, the court quoted Rockingham v. Board of Trustees of Elon
College47 to offer guidance:
The pervading principle to be observed by the General
Assembly in the exercise of [tax] powers is equality and fair
play. It is the will of the people of North Carolina, as expressed
in the organic law, that justice shall prevail in tax matters, with
equal rights to all and special privileges to none.48
The Lumberton court concluded that while striking a balance may be
difficult in some situations, the “City’s 59,900% minimum tax increase
is wholly detached from the moorings of anything reasonably
resembling a just and equitable tax.”49
The court refused to articulate the actual parameters of the Just
and Equitable Tax Clause, citing the 59,900% increase as “unusual
facts” that “transgressed the boundaries of permissible taxation and

campgrounds and trailer parks, $12.50; bicycle dealers, $25.00; restaurants, $0.50 per
customer seat with a minimum tax of $25.00; pinball machines or similar amusements,
$25.00; bowling alleys, $10.00 per alley; movie theaters, $200.00 per room. Granted, the
mere amount of the tax does not prove its invalidity. However, the discrepancy between
the tax imposed by the Ordinance upon Cyber Gambling establishments and all other
businesses, while not conclusive evidence of the inequity of the tax, makes summary
judgment improper.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
43. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 459–60, 738 S.E.2d 156, 158 (2013).
44. Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158–59.
45. Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 159.
46. Id. at 459–60, 738 S.E.2d at 158. The court refused to consider the language
merely “precatory,” explaining that “[t]he people of North Carolina placed the Just and
Equitable Tax Clause in their Constitution, and we are not at liberty to selectively dismiss
its relevance.” Id. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158.
47. 219 N.C. 342, 13 S.E.2d 618 (1941).
48. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 461, 738 S.E.2d at 159 (alteration in original) (quoting
Rockingham, 219 N.C. 342 at 344–45, 13 S.E.2d at 620).
49. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160.
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constituted an abuse of the City’s tax-levying discretion.”50 It did,
however, point to Nesbitt to suggest a methodology.51 The Nesbitt
factors—city size, exemptions from alternate taxes, and sales
volume—would not be exhaustive, the court admonished, but would
provide a framework for evaluating Just and Equitable claims on a
contextual basis.52 To illustrate, the court referenced the “stark
difference” between the tax levied on the cyber gaming businesses
and those levied on other economic activities as weighing against the
tax’s validity.53
The most striking aspect of the holding is the court’s reliance on
the percentage increase to overturn the tax. Though the court offered
a caveat that “any large increase in a tax, or simply a high tax, would
[not] alone be enough to run afoul” of the Clause, its holding
references only the percentage increase as rendering the tax
impermissible.54 Evaluating taxes solely on the basis of their
relationship to past years’ taxes is not a particularly coherent or
principled standard, one which lower courts are already struggling to
apply.55 In contrast, a contextual approach—such as that modeled in
Nesbitt and endorsed in Lumberton—does not rely solely on a brightline comparison of yearly tax rates. The court could easily apply a
comprehensive analysis that looks at other factors, such as additional
tax burdens or exemptions, the relationship between the tax and
income or net revenue, the profile of groups or businesses affected by
the tax, the necessity or luxury of the goods or services taxed, and the

50. Id.
51. Id. The court noted that Nesbitt considered the “size of the city, sales volume, and
exemptions from alternate taxes.” Id. at 461, 738 S.E.2d at 159.
52. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160.
53. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160; see also supra note 42.
54. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160 (“While these competing considerations might be
difficult to reconcile in nuanced cases, the case at bar is hardly nuanced. Here, the City’s
59,900% minimum tax increase is wholly detached from the moorings of anything
reasonably resembling a just and equitable tax. If the Just and Equitable Tax Clause has
any substantive force, as we hold it does, it surely renders the present tax invalid.”).
55. See Smith v. City of Fayetteville, __ N.C. App. __, __, 743 S.E.2d 662, 665–66
(2013) (“While we acknowledge a 8,900% tax increase is not as substantial as the 59,900%
increase in IMT, we conclude the 8,900% increase violates the Just and Equitable Tax
Clause for the reasons stated in IMT. Specifically, the City’s 8,900% ‘minimum tax
increase is wholly detached from the moorings of anything reasonably resembling a just
and equitable tax.’ Therefore, it is unconstitutional as a matter of law. Without a fullydeveloped record and given the Supreme Court’s reluctance to further define a
methodology for evaluating just and equitable taxation claims, we are unwilling to
articulate a methodology similar to the methodology previously adopted by this panel in
Smith I.” (quoting Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160)).
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state’s interest in discouraging or incentivizing a particular practice.56
This comprehensive approach would be more consistent with
historical conceptions of fair tax policy.57 The next Part applies these
conceptions to reevaluate the Lumberton court’s analysis and to
propose a challenge to North Carolina’s recent increase of the mobile
and modular home sales tax.
II. UNDERSTANDING AND APPLYING “JUST AND EQUITABLE” TAX
POLICY
If the Supreme Court of North Carolina indeed intends to apply
the Just and Equitable Tax Clause as a “distinct and enforceable”
restriction on the power of taxation,58 the potential challenges to
current laws are limited only by the imagination of North Carolina
attorneys. The scope of the Clause is still undetermined, its future
lines opaque. The facts of Lumberton may be extreme, but the cited
precedent, language, and reasoning are expansive. As Lumberton
invites courts to address substantive tax policy as matters of justice
and equity, creative lawyers have a unique opportunity to forge the
purview of the Clause as a limitation on the legislature’s tax
structures. Of course, there is no settled normatively “just” or
“equitable” form of taxation. Questions of tax policy generate
extensive debate because their answers ultimately rest on moral and
practical considerations shaped by the contours of political ideology.
A. The Essential Principles of Equitable Tax Policy
Although the Lumberton court did not reference moral or ethical
considerations in its opinion on the license fee tax, notions of just and
equitable taxation are inextricable from political morality. Tax policy
helps to shape our system of ownership and property rights; it
implicates distributive justice principles as well as complex ethical
issues.59 It necessarily raises philosophical questions about the rights
and responsibilities that exist in both the relationships between the
government and its citizens and between the individual and the
collective. How much individuals should contribute and for what
56. North Carolina may be the only state to have equity language in its constitutional
tax provisions, although this paper does not assess whether other states are
constitutionally obligated to analyze whether a tax is fair. Because the state supreme court
advocated a contextual approach to an equity assessment, a number of factors potentially
could be relevant to North Carolina tax policy.
57. See infra Part II.A.
58. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 460, 738 S.E.2d at 158.
59. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND
JUSTICE 7–10 (2002).

CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 912 (2015)

2015]

JUST AND EQUITABLE TAX CLAUSE

921

purposes, which persons or what property should be exempt, and
what specific post-tax inequalities are appropriate are all “morally
loaded and hotly disputed questions about our obligations to one
another through the fiscal operations of our common government.”60
To assess fiscal fairness is to ultimately address questions of economic
and social justice.
Theories of distributive justice have generally incorporated
principles colloquially known as vertical and horizontal equity to
assess whether a tax is “fair.”61 This historical conception of fair tax
policy, though not without criticism, is “a standard for evaluating
differences in the tax treatment of different people: the principle that
like-situated persons must be burdened equally and relevantly unlike
persons unequally.”62 The basic “norms” of vertical and horizontal
equity are thus corollaries of each other.63 Horizontal equity
addresses fair taxation for similarly situated persons; vertical equity
addresses fair taxation for dissimilarly situated persons.64 Measured
on these traditional axes, a fair tax system ideally recognizes that
“similarly situated taxpayers must be treated alike and that differently
situated taxpayers must be treated in ways that reflect their
differences.”65
While simple in theory, both vertical and horizontal equity are
complex in practice. Horizontal equity tends to be a less controversial
“norm” than vertical equity,66 but it can be difficult to apply.67 If
fairness requires that like taxpayers be taxed equally, one must
identify the factors that determine like or unlike status. Historically,
this analysis has considered substantive factors such as income,

60. Id. at 3.
61. See Richard J. Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON
HALL L. REV. 421, 424 (2006).
62. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 12–13. See generally Paul R. McDaniel &
James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1
FLA. TAX REV. 607 (1993) (exploring whether the principles of horizontal and vertical
equity contain any independent normative value useful to the tax policy debate).
63. See Wood, supra note 61, at 422.
64. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13.
65. Wood, supra note 61, at 424.
66. See id. (noting that there is little debate about whether horizontal equity is a
desirable policy norm); id. at 428 (explaining that vertical equity is less established as a
“valid component of tax fairness”).
67. Id. at 424–25; see also David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax
Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43, 44–45 (2006) (noting the practical and tautological
difficulties presented by the theory of horizontal equity).
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wealth, and consumption to determine the status of the tax base.68
Vertical equity, a more progressive system of taxation, requires
wealthier citizens to contribute more than low-income citizens.69
Fiscal policy seeks to achieve vertical equity in either proportional or
progressive structures.70 A proportional structure applies a common
percentage tax on income (a “flat tax”) or consumption (such as
North Carolina’s 3% tax on automobiles).71 Progressive structures
increase the percentage tax as income or consumption rises.72
These basic principles are subject to criticism, however, as they
may exclude other political values essential to a thorough analysis of
fiscal justice.73 But the discourse of horizontal and vertical equity is
still “an excellent way to bring out the nature and complexity of the
issues of political morality that tax policy must address.”74 The
following two sections assess these principles and the issues they raise,
first in a reconsideration of Lumberton and finally in a theoretical
challenge to North Carolina’s recent sales tax increase on mobile and
modular homes.
B.

Tax Equity Principles As Applied to Lumberton

It is easy to see that the privilege license fee levied on gaming
parlors in Lumberton was not strictly horizontally equitable with the
fees levied on the city’s other economic activities, if one accepts that
“economic activities” is the appropriate status classification for
gaming parlors. Beyond that, the license fee equity issue becomes
68. Wood, supra note 61, at 427; see also John A. Miller, Rationalizing Injustice: The
Supreme Court and Property Tax, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 79, 126 (1993) (explaining that
“the possible indices of equality may be income, consumption or wealth”).
69. Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for
Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 116 (1999).
70. See id. at 116–17.
71. See id.; Highway Use and Property Taxes, N.C. DIV. OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
http://www.ncdot.gov/dmv/vehicle/title/tax/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
72. See Martinez, supra note 69, at 117. For example, the North Carolina income tax
rate on the highest earners used to be 7.5%. See supra note 7. The North Carolina
legislature created a mostly flat income tax in 2013, taxing wage earners at 5.8%. See supra
note 7. This restructuring reversed a progressive vertical tax, in which the state’s highest
earners contributed a larger share of income, and replaced it with a proportional tax.
Although the higher earners will continue to contribute more dollars in the flat tax, the
reduced rate is a regressive adjustment for the North Carolina tax code.
73. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13. For example, Murphy and Nagel
explain that “justice” in taxes must encompass not just revenues, but expenditures and
benefits as well. Id. at 14–15. The authors also question the assumption that “pretax
market outcomes are presumptively just.” See id. at 15. As noted previously, there is the
additional issue of whether horizontal and vertical equity principles possess any
independent normative content. See McDaniel and Repetti, supra note 62, at 607.
74. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 13.
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murkier. The common law approach, which the court rejected,
measured tax fairness in terms of the fee’s relationship to revenue75—
a principle of vertical equity.76 Had the court applied a similar
standard, it might have compared the gaming parlors’ net profits with
those of other businesses subject to the annual tax. As Judge Robert
C. Hunter of the appellate court noted in his dissent, though the
license fee at issue was much higher than the fees levied on
campgrounds, trailer parks, bicycle dealers, restaurants, pinball
machines, bowling alleys, and movie theaters, the discrepancy alone
would not render the tax invalid.77 Judge Hunter’s observation
implicitly recognized that horizontal inequity could be mitigated by
other considerations in vertical equity.
Other factors may weigh in the analysis as well. For instance, the
City of Lumberton, recently ranked number one in a list of America’s
poorest cities,78 was very likely trying to curb what it perceived to be
socially injurious behavior.79 The practice of imposing “sin taxes”—
which discourage culturally unfavorable behavior and/or raise
substantial revenue80—dates back to the American Revolution.81 The
more technical term, “excise tax,” refers to taxes levied on some but
not all products.82 Excise taxes are thus an intentional deviation from
strict horizontal equity designed to further some other social value.
Moreover, if Lumberton’s gaming parlor businesses were generating

75. See supra notes 39–46 and accompanying text.
76. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
77. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 219 N.C. App. 36, 49, 724 S.E.2d 588, 597 (2012)
(Hunter, J., dissenting), rev’d, 366 N.C. 456, 738 S.E.2d 156 (2013); see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
78. See Christine DiGangi, The Poorest Areas in America, CREDIT.COM (Sept. 24,
2013), http://blog.credit.com/2013/09/poorest-cities-in-america/.
79. See, e.g., Editorial, Tax ‘em to Death, NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro, N.C.), May
18, 2012, at A14 (explaining that Greensboro and other North Carolina cities were
enacting heavy taxes to discourage Internet sweepstakes operators).
80. See, e.g., Asha Rangappa, The Cost of Freedom: Using the Tax Power to Limit
Personal Arsenals, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 17, 19 (2013),
http://ylpr.yale.edu/sites/default/files/IA/the_cost_of_freedom_32_yale_l_poly_rev_inter_a
lia_17_2013.pdf (noting that excise taxes are “powerful tool[s] to shape social policy”). For
instance, two doctors at the Mayo Clinic have advocated implementing or increasing the
tax rate on substances that contribute to poor health and social behavior. Michael J.
Joyner & David O. Warner, The Syntax of Sin Taxes: Putting It Together to Improve
Physical, Social, and Fiscal Health, 88 MAYO CLINIC PROC., 536, 536–39 (2013), available
at http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(13)00128-6/pdf.
81. See Brenda Yelvington, Excise Taxes in Historical Perspective, in TAXING
CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 31, 32 (William F.
Shughart II ed., 1997).
82. James Sadowsky, The Economics of Sin Taxes, RELIGION & LIBERTY, Mar.–Apr.
1994, at 1, 1.
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substantial revenue, particularly from citizens whose median annual
income is below $30,000,83 then a fairness assessment might look quite
different. One could argue that it is indeed “just and equitable” to
impose substantial fees on businesses that reap large profits by
exploiting the poor. At the very least, there would be reason to
question whether the tax increase was truly “wholly detached from
the moorings of anything reasonably resembling a just and equitable
tax.”84 But regardless of whether the Lumberton court reached the
correct result, the opinion’s endorsement of the Just and Equitable
Tax Clause as a substantive limitation offers potential redress for
other dubious tax schemes.
C.

Tax Equity Principles As Applied to the Mobile Home Sales Tax

Lumberton’s empowerment of the Just and Equitable Tax Clause
potentially provides an opportunity for poverty lawyers to challenge
tax structures that unfairly burden North Carolina’s lower income
residents. The 2014 change to mobile and modular home sales tax law
provides a timely and salient example. Prior to January 1, 2014,
mobile homes were subject to a retail sales tax of 2%, with a
maximum tax of $300 for a singlewide and $600 for a doublewide.85 In
the summer of 2013, as part of comprehensive changes to North
Carolina tax law, the General Assembly amended section 105164.4(a)(1) of the General Statutes to increase the sales tax on mobile
homes to the general rate of 4.75%.86 The General Assembly also
amended section 105-164.4(a)(8) of the General Statutes to increase
the sales tax on modular homes from 2.5% to 4.75%.87 The legislature
left intact the 3%, $1500 maximum tax on aircraft and boats as well as

83. See Christina DiGangi, supra note 78.
84. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 462, 738 S.E.2d 156, 160 (2013).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1a) (2011), amended by Act of July 23, 2013, ch.
316, § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 860, 870 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105164.4(a)(1a) (2013)); SALES & USE TAX DIV., N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, LEGISLATIVE
CHANGES TO SALES AND USE TAX 1 (2013), available at http://www.dornc.com/
downloads/e505_9-13.pdf; see also John Murawski, NC’s New Tax Law To Increase
Typical Mobile Home By More Than $2000, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Dec. 27,
2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/12/27/3488433/ncs-new-tax-law-will-increase.html
(“The mobile home tax now is capped at $300 for single-wides and $600 for doublewides.”).
86. Act of July 23, 2013, ch. 316, § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws 860, 870 (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1a) (2013)); Murawski, supra note 85; Sales and Use Tax,
N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://www.dornc.com/taxes/sales/salesanduse.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2015).
87. § 3.1(a), 2013 N.C. Sess. Laws at 870 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105164.4(a)(8) (2013)).
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the existing 3% tax applied to other motor vehicles.88 North
Carolina’s excise tax on transfers of site-built homes likewise remains
at 0.2%.89
For a singlewide mobile home priced at $40,600, the 2014 sales
tax increases from $300 to $1,928.50; for a doublewide priced at
$74,200, the bill rises from $600 to $3,524.50.90 In Lumberton terms,
this represents more than a 500% tax hike. Not surprisingly, the
increase primarily affects lower-income North Carolinians who
purchase mobile homes as their principal place of residence.91 One
Raleigh retailer who sells between twenty-four and thirty-six mobile
and modular homes a year says his customers’ annual incomes range
from $24,000 to $72,000.92
The tax on a 1985 Bertram 78 yacht recently listed for sale in
Wilmington for $575,000? Still $1,500.93 The transfer tax on a $200,000
site-built home? Just $400.94 Both the mobile home tax’s percentage
adjustment and the discrepancy with other property tax rates thus
present a possible challenge to the new rates under the Just and
Equitable Tax Clause as envisioned in Lumberton.
For lawmakers restructuring the state tax code, the tax hike on
mobile homes is purportedly about “tax fairness and tax
simplification.”95 State Representative David Lewis, a Republican
from Harnett County, asserted that “[i]t’s fair that the tax for the
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-164.4(a)(1b) (2013); see also Highway Use and Property
Taxes, supra note 71 (noting that there is a 3% highway use tax on vehicles). Although
mobile homes are sometimes purchased for recreational or investment purposes, boats
and aircraft are more likely to be recreational vehicles than primary residences.
89. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (“The [excise tax rate on the conveyance of
real property] is one dollar ($1.00) on each five hundred dollars ($500) or fractional part
thereof of the consideration or value of the interest conveyed.”).
90. Murawski, supra note 85.
91. See id.
92. Id. Under the new tax scheme, the sales tax on a mobile home could be up to 8%
of an individual’s income. The United States Census Bureau calculated North Carolina’s
median income at $46,334 for the years 2009–13. State and County QuickFacts, North
Carolina, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/37000.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2015). The federal government defined the 2013 poverty threshold for a
family of four at $23,550. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/13poverty.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
93. See Sales and Use Tax, supra note 86 (stating that there is a 3% maximum of
$1500 tax on the retail sale of boats).
94. See § 105-228.30(a) (“The [excise tax rate on the conveyance of real property] is
one dollar ($1.00) on each five hundred dollars ($500) or fractional part thereof of the
consideration or value of the interest conveyed.”).
95. Paul Woolverton, Boost of N.C. Sales Tax Causes Sticker Shock for Potential
Mobile Home Buyers, FAYETTEVILLE OBSERVER (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.fayobserver.com/
news/local/article_60651121-ce9b-5173-96f8-2e4b7b6e4244.html.
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same thing—a home’s a home—be roughly the same.”96 Even if
Representative Lewis is right that mobile homes are more
appropriately categorized with site-built homes than with
automobiles, it is not clear why lawmakers did not simply apply North
Carolina’s 0.2% real property transfer tax to mobile homes.97 And if
mobile and modular homes are instead correctly categorized with
vehicles, aircraft, and boats, their new tax burden is anything but
similar.
From a horizontal equity perspective, then, the new mobile home
tax is clearly unfair. It taxes mobile homes at a proportionally higher
rate than either site-built homes or vehicles, the two categories most
logically similar to mobile homes. The vertical equity question is more
interesting, and it reveals some of the uncertainties inherent in the
traditional analysis. As a proportional consumption tax, the mobile
home tax may be technically equitable: both the wealthy and the poor
will pay the same sales tax rate for their mobile homes, while the
indigent will continue to enjoy a tax break on yacht or jet purchases.
A progressive structure of vertical equity envisions the converse
because it considers the relative status of the purchasers.98 A
progressive analysis would acknowledge the elephantine reality that
mobile home buyers are primarily lower-income, while boat and
aircraft buyers are likely to be wealthier.99
Lawmakers also pursue vertical equity by reducing tax liability
on necessities, such as food, where lower-income individuals spend a
higher percentage of their income compared to wealthier
individuals.100 For instance, a $600 housing payment is over 30% of
the monthly income for a family living at the poverty line, but only
12% of the monthly income for a household bringing in $60,000
96. Id.
97. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.30(a) (2013). Representative Lewis argued that
mobile home buyers should have a similar tax burden to buyers of site-built homes.
Woolverton, supra note 95. Buyers of site-built homes, claimed Lewis, pay the relevant
sales tax on the building materials used in constructing the home. Id. Thus, according to
Lewis, mobile home buyers should be forced to pay an equivalent sales tax. Id. But this
argument does not account for the fact that mobile homes must also be constructed with
materials equally subject to sales tax.
98. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Igor Volsky, North Carolina Lawmakers Ram Through Plan That Would
(July
16,
2013),
Increase
Taxes
on
Poor
People,
THINKPROGRESS
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2013/07/16/2308621/north-carolina-lawmakers-ramthrough-plan-to-tax-poor-people-more-after-just-25-minutes-of-debate/# (noting that the
sales tax on mobile and modular homes primarily affects lower-income citizens); supra
notes 69–72 and accompanying text.
100. See 2 WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION § 13.09[1]
(3rd ed. 2010).
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annually. While legislators and their constituents may disagree over
what exactly constitutes a necessity or whether those items should be
taxed, most individuals can appreciate that North Carolina residents
must afford adequate shelter, food, and clothing. Vertical equity
principles weigh in favor of decreasing the tax burden on these items,
particularly in the context of lower-income housing like mobile
homes.
One important prospect for the Just and Equitable Tax Clause,
then, is the opportunity to redress recent tax restructuring that raises
taxes on low-income citizens. While it may be that the 2013 General
Assembly has decided to impose a “sin tax” on the condition of
poverty in North Carolina, the disproportionate burdening of the
poor runs contrary to the philosophical underpinnings of the equity
axes. Regressive taxation also contradicts the Supreme Court of
North Carolina’s cited precedent: the requirement that “ ‘justice shall
prevail in tax matters, with equal rights to all and special privileges to
none.’ ”101 Under a Lumberton analysis, courts could assess both the
current tax’s relationship to the prior tax as well as the contextual
factors surrounding the new tax.102 These factors should at least begin
with the issues implicated by the traditional conceptions of horizontal
and vertical equity. For the mobile and modular home sales tax, the
percent increase becomes even more problematic when evaluated in
light of other factors, notably its disproportionate impact on lowincome North Carolinians and its dissimilarity to taxation of similar
property. A court could also assess the nature of the purchase—
unlike most yachts, a mobile home provides many residents in North
Carolina with a basic necessity of life: a roof over the heads of their
families.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW: REPLACING DEFERENCE WITH DEBATE?
Beyond the consideration of how a court might apply the Just
and Equitable Tax Clause, the weightier question is whether it
should. Since Justice Marshall affirmed the necessity of taxation in
McCulloch v. Maryland,103 the United States Supreme Court has
consistently emphasized three themes within tax policy: the
government’s power to tax; the importance of judicial deference to
legislatures; and the need for an “exceedingly high threshold” to
101. IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, 366 N.C. 456, 461, 738 S.E.2d 156, 159 (2013)
(quoting Rockingham Cnty. v. Bd. of Trs. of Elon College, 219 N.C. 342, 344–45, 13 S.E.2d
618, 620 (1941)).
102. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160.
103. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425 (1819).
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render a tax unconstitutional.104 North Carolina has similarly given
“substantial deference . . . to legislative tax classifications.”105 In
refusing to articulate the parameters of the Just and Equitable Tax
Clause, the Lumberton court cited this “nearly universal deference”
to legislative tax classifications.106
Nevertheless, in addition to overturning the license fee, the
Lumberton court spoke broadly of the need to “protect the public
from abusive tax policies.”107 “[T]his principle is even more
warranted,” the court continued, “when the State has been
constitutionally charged with ‘the duty to tax in a just and equitable
manner.’ ”108 Although the court refrained from defining or limiting
the Clause, it directed trial courts to apply a contextual methodology
in assessing claims under the Clause.109 By defining the Clause as a
substantive limitation and inviting lower courts to apply a case-bycase analysis, the Supreme Court of North Carolina boldly introduced
the question of tax fairness to the arena of judicial review.
Furthermore, if the court was correct that North Carolina tax policy
has a constitutional equity requirement, then the Lumberton decision
potentially turns the tide of legislative deference in North Carolina.
Considering that Van Hecke, and perhaps other legal scholars,
understood the Clause as a judicial check on the legislature,110 the
court may simply be eight decades late in assuming this responsibility.
But one might still expect the court to retreat from this position
as soon as possible, as it imposes the judiciary as a super-legislature
on almost every form and function of taxation. Furthermore, as
discussed in Part II, questions of justice and equity in tax policy are
both complex and controversial.111 Yet the broader question of the
judiciary’s role in fiscal policy is an important one. It suggests at least
two significant considerations: the ability of the political process to
achieve equitable taxation with minimal judicial review, and, to the
degree that tax policy implicates moral considerations or protected
liberties, the role of the court in introducing moral and political
theory into public debate.
104. See Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the
Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 427 (2004).
105. Lumberton, 366 N.C. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 159.
106. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 160.
107. Id. at 462, 738 S.E.2d at 159.
108. Id. (quoting Lenoir Fin. Co. v. Currie, 254 N.C. 129, 132, 118 S.E.2d 543, 545
(1961)).
109. Id. at 462–63, 738 S.E.2d at 160.
110. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text.
111. See supra Part II.
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A. The Democratic Process and the Public Knowledge Gap in Tax
Policy
The political process rationale for entrusting legislatures with tax
matters assumes that citizens both understand tax policy and can
assess its philosophical justifications.112 But one scholar notes that
empirical studies do not support this assumption, explaining that
“though the public may believe current taxation is unfair, when asked
to specify what rate structure would be fair (based on income)
respondents tended to choose rates remarkably similar to those
actually in place.”113 In 2011, the Public Policy Institute of California
conducted a survey that revealed California’s knowledge gap on state
and local finances.114 Despite voters’ belief that they had substantial
knowledge of the state’s revenue and spending practices, only 16%
knew that K-12 education was the state’s largest expenditure.115 Just
29% correctly identified personal income tax as the state’s primary
source of revenue.116 The survey found that “[o]nly [six] percent of
adults and [nine] percent of likely voters are able to identify both the
state’s top area of spending and its top revenue source.”117
While fiscal policy affects every American, it is painfully clear
that the general population is not well educated on the topic, much
less informed about how taxation relates to theories of equity.
Moreover, while most individuals have an instinctive conception of
fairness, fairness in tax policy is uniquely multi-faceted. A general
sense of what is “fair” or “unfair” is unlikely to adequately encompass
the moral, political, economic, and practical complexities that
permeate tax policy.118

112. See Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 297, 298 (2009) (arguing that the “democratic process is not up to the task of
dealing with tax policy”). Martinez faults the branches of government as well as the
citizenry. Id. He explains, “The public seems largely ignorant of how taxes work.
Decisions made by voters without a full appreciation of what is at stake. Existing
commentary on the public’s perceptions of tax systems demonstrate that the popular
concept of taxation diverges significantly from reality. It is nothing short of surprising to
observe the extent to which people misperceive taxes and the system of taxation.” Id. at
312.
113. Martinez, supra note 104, at 418.
114. MARK BALDASSARE ET AL., PPIC STATEWIDE SURVEY: CALIFORNIANS AND
THEIR GOVERNMENT 5 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/
S_111MBS.pdf.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Essay, What Do Women Want: Feminism and the
Progressive Income Tax, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 151 (1997).
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The breadth of the issue further complicates the awareness
problem. Taxes structure our society at every level, and questions of
what should be funded and who will pay for it delve into the most
minute of conceivable public purposes.119 Even if appropriate
purposes can be agreed upon, lawmakers must consider mechanisms
for collecting taxes, the base measurement (e.g., property, income, or
consumption), and, of course, what categories of goods or services
should be exempt from taxation.120
Savvy politicians handily exploit public misconceptions or
prejudices about this intricate and daunting subject. As part of an
effort to restrict Pre-K eligibility in 2012, Representative George
Cleveland, a Republican from Jacksonville, North Carolina, objected
to a reference to the number of North Carolina children living in
poverty or extreme poverty.121 He told state legislators that “[w]e
have no one in the state of North Carolina living in extreme
poverty.”122 According to Representative Cleveland, extreme poverty
is “living on a dollar and a half a day . . . . I don’t think we have
anybody in North Carolina doing that.”123 Representative Cleveland
not only failed to distinguish North Carolina from a developing
country,124 he ignored the reality that North Carolina’s youngest
children may suffer the most from their impoverished
circumstances.125

119. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 5.
120. See id.
121. Lynn Bonner, Jacksonville Lawmaker Says No ‘Extreme Poverty’ in N.C., NEWS
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.) (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.newsobserver.com/2012/03/02/
1897815_rep-rejects-poverty-label.html?rh=1; Chris Fitzsimon, Shamed to Reconsider,
N.C. POLICY WATCH (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:00 P.M.), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2012/
03/01/shamed-to-reconsider/; Saki Knafo, George Cleveland, Republican Rep, Claims No
Extreme Poverty In North Carolina As Preschool Cuts Weighed, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
2, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/george-cleveland-poverty-north-carolina_
n_1317554.html.
122. Knafo, supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. Editorial, Preschool Education An Investment in State’s Children, STARNEWS
(Wilmington, N.C.) (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20120305/
ARTICLES/120309846?p=1&tc=pg (“Cleveland later explained that he was comparing
conditions in the United States to those of people in Third World countries.”). The United
States Census Bureau reports that more than 17% of North Carolina residents live in
poverty. State and County QuickFacts, North Carolina, supra note 92.
125. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Katherine Magnuson, The Long Reach of Early
Childhood Poverty, PATHWAYS, Winter 2011, at 22, 24, available at http://web.stanford.edu/
group/scspi/_media/pdf/pathways/winter_2011/PathwaysWinter11_Duncan.pdf (highlighting
“emerging research linking poverty occurring as early as the prenatal year to adult outcomes
as far as the fourth decade of life”).
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Defending the plan to restructure the North Carolina tax code in
2013, Republican State Senator Phil Berger wrote, “Expect liberal
elitists and their media cheerleaders to wage class warfare. They will
fight to protect the unfair status quo that takes the fruits of your labor
and gives it to someone else.”126 Such rhetorical appeals to class
warfare and “makers and takers” preclude sophisticated analysis and
arguably ensconce politicians from more precise discussions of
fairness.127 What is unclear, however, is whether judicial policing of
tax structures would be more effective to defeat prejudice and
misconceptions.
B.

The Role of the Judiciary in Exploring Economic Justice

The moral dimensions of distributive justice may have attracted
more attention in the aftermath of the Great Recession, but “they
have generated [a] less sophisticated discussion, from a moral point of
view, than other public questions that have a moral dimension.”128
Issues of “freedom of expression, pornography, abortion, equal
protection, affirmative action, the regulation of sexual conduct,
religious liberty, euthanasia, and assisted suicide” tend to occupy the
field of social justice.129 Fiscal policy, however, is also a fundamentally
moral issue.
It is indisputable that tax policy is interwoven with other issues
more traditionally viewed as social questions. For example, in 2013,
the Supreme Court permitted same-sex couples to file joint federal
tax returns, striking down a key provision in the Defense of Marriage
Act.130 The decision in United States v. Windsor established same-sex
couples as alike to heterosexual couples for purposes of federal tax
benefits, signaling far-reaching changes to both social and fiscal
policy.131 Other scholars have proposed a more direct approach to
126. Phil Berger, Guest Commentary: Our Tax System Is Broken, DAILY HERALD
(Roanoke Rapids, N.C.) (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.rrdailyherald.com/opinion/columns/
guest-commentary-our-tax-system-is-broken/article_25b88a10-6bbf-11e2-ac30-001a4bcf
887a.html.
127. Paul Krugman, Makers, Takers, Fakers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/opinion/krugman-makers-takers-fakers-.html?_r=0.
128. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 3–4.
129. Id. at 4.
130. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
131. Id. at 2694–96. The Obama administration and a number of federal agencies have
since revised their policies to be consistent with Windsor. See, e.g., Press Release, HHS,
HHS Announces First Guidance Implementing Supreme Court’s Decision on the Defense
of Marriage Act (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2013pres/
08/20130829a.html (announcing that “all beneficiaries in private Medicare plans have
access to equal coverage when it comes to care in a nursing home where their spouse
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highlighting indigence and inequality, suggesting that the Supreme
Court could consider poverty a suspect classification under Equal
Protection.132 Rising wealth disparity itself is a function of economic
policy,133 and it raises complex moral questions of how much or what
kind of inequality should be permissible. Where tax policy creates,
reinforces, or ignores the growing chasm between the wealthy and the
poor, the resulting hardships and remedies are just as much a moral
concern as any so-called social issue.
One possible factor in fiscal policy’s absence from the
conversation is the judiciary’s traditional reluctance to involve itself in
tax matters.134 As opposed to legislative politics, where rhetoric often
serves elected officials better than incisive critique, courts welcome
extensive, meticulous argument.135 Authors Liam Murphy and
Thomas Nagel point out that “in defining individual rights through
constitutional interpretation, [the courts have] had a large influence
on the introduction of moral and political theory into those other
areas of public debate.”136 The courts may likewise be instrumental in
ensuring that the popular conscious both understands taxation as a
moral issue and appreciates some of the complexities that drive tax
policy decision. At the very least, the examination and interpretation
lives”); Press Release, IRS, IR-2013-72, Treasury and IRS Announce That All Legal
Same-Sex Marriages Will Be Recognized For Federal Tax Purposes; Ruling Provides
Certainty, Benefits and Protections Under Federal Tax Law for Same-Sex Married
Couples (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Treasury-and-IRSAnnounce-That-All-Legal-Same-Sex-Marriages-Will-Be-Recognized-For-Federal-TaxPurposes;-Ruling-Provides-Certainty,-Benefits-and-Protections-Under-Federal-Tax-Lawfor-Same-Sex-Married-Couples (allowing all same-sex married couples to file a joint
federal return, regardless of whether they live in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex
marriage); Memorandum from Elaine Kaplan, Acting Dir., U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., to
the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 28, 2013), available at
https://www.chcoc.gov/transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalID=5700
(informing federal agencies that same-sex married couples could now file for federal
benefits).
132. See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty
Law, Dual Rules of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 644–49, 670
(2008) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “deconstitutionalized Poverty Law” by,
among other things, “circumvent[ing] . . . suspect class or classification analysis”); Henry
Rose, The Poor as a Suspect Class Under the Equal Protection Clause: An Open
Constitutional Question, 34 NOVA L. REV. 407, 407 (2010) (contending that poverty as a
suspect classification is still an open question in Supreme Court jurisprudence).
133. See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL
POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER AND TURNED ITS BACK ON
THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010) (examining political and economic decisions over the past
thirty years that have shifted the American economy to favor the wealthy).
134. See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text.
135. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 59, at 4.
136. Id.
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of certain provisions through litigation allow the public to consider
not just how tax policy affects one personally, but, perhaps more
importantly, how it treats others.
This is not to say that judicial review of tax policy is necessarily
desirable. Although the North Carolina judiciary is popularly elected,
the legitimacy of the court’s intrusion into the legislative arena is still
a concern.137 State residents may rightly suspect that entrusting
significant decisions to many elected officials is more democratic than
entrusting them to a few. Additionally, activist courts that abandon a
time-honored deference risk creating a “vast wasteland of confusing,
conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”138 But as
long as North Carolina has opened its courtrooms to questions of tax
fairness, it is worth inquiring whether judicial review offers any
cognizable benefit. Increased public education and debate on the
relationship between economic policy and social justice may be one
such benefit. At the very least, judicial review may encourage citizens
and their lawyers to recognize tax policy as a values-based system. As
with other social issues, questions of tax fairness potentially produce
more substantial public debate in the courts than through the political
process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has determined that the
Just and Equitable Tax Clause operates as a substantive
constitutional limitation on tax policy. The challenge for the courts
will be to define the parameters of the Clause and determine which
tax practices are so unfair as to be unconstitutional. But theories of
economic justice rest on sophisticated moral and practical
considerations. Traditional conceptions of horizontal and vertical
equity provide a useful framework for highlighting the complexities
implicated in questions of tax fairness. By applying these principles,
North Carolina lawyers can present compelling challenges to current
tax policies that disproportionately harm the poor, such as the mobile
home sales tax.
The judiciary has historically been reluctant to review tax policy,
and the Supreme Court of North Carolina may well decide to step
137. See Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 837, 849–50 (2011).
138. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 763 (1992). As one scholar notes, however, the incoherence criticism for case
law applies equally to the federal Constitution, particularly in the area of Fourth
Amendment law. See Landau, supra note 137, at 843–44.
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back from determining matters of tax equity. However, unlike
electoral politics, the courts provide a unique forum for substantial
argument and analysis of economic justice. Judicial review potentially
serves to emphasize and explore the relationship between taxes and
political morality, engaging the public in meaningful debate about the
contours of social justice.
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